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We model the panic of 2008 as part of the wealth and substitution effects deriving from a housing
price crash that began in 2006.  The dissipation of the wealth effect stimulates a reorganization of
the banking industry and increases in employment, GDP, and unemployment.  The release of resources
from the housing sector lowers investment goods prices, and thereby devalues existing non-residential
capital while stimulating non-residential investment.  These predictions are compared with measured
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  The financial and housing sectors are experiencing dramatic and historically 
unusual changes.  These changes garner world-wide public attention.  Rarely do so many 
people look to economics for a framework for understanding the events and predicting 
something about the uncertain future. 
The purpose of this paper is to forecast sectoral and aggregate market responses 
(measured as GDP, consumption, investment, entry, etc.) to these changes using simple, 
off-the-shelf economic models of market fundamentals.  I also make attempts to forecast 
various prices, although in some cases the off-the-shelf models have a better track record 
for predicting quantities. 
  There are a couple of reasons why we limit the modeling to market fundamentals, 
and in the process abstract from game theoretic/strategic considerations, political 
economy, and nominal rigidities.  First of all, the models of fundamentals are simpler 
(“just” supply and demand), and thereby confer a couple of intellectual benefits: (a) they 
provide a useful benchmark against which to understand the workings of more 
complicated models (Barro 1997, chapter 20), (b) they provide a coherent account of both 
sectoral- and aggregate-level responses without significant modification of the models 
from the literature, and (c) they generate forecasts with less effort, so that we can provide 
some forecasts to our colleagues in October 2008 rather than, say, October 2009. 
  Second, to the extent that existing models (of any kind) can forecast economic 
quantities, I expect that market fundamentals will do the bulk of the work.  Part of our 
judgment is based on our perception of the empirical success of those models, but part of 
it is dictated by the situation – as long as the Federal Reserve works (by intention or by 
accident) to prevent a deflation, various nominal rigidities will conveniently remain less   2
important.  In other words, nominal rigidities would merit more attention if we thought 
the price level were going to fall. 
  As with the panic itself, this paper begins in Section I with the housing boom of 
2001-2006.  By 2006, housing prices had exceeded long run replacement cost by as much 
as 100%, which motivated lots of residential construction and meant that real housing 
prices might eventually fall 50% from their peak.  In hindsight, we saw housing prices 
fall this much over a short period of time. 
  The economic logic of this paper is simple: the housing crash has both an adverse 
wealth effect and a substitution effect.  The adverse wealth effect comes from the fact 
that the economy spent significant resources to build housing quickly, when ultimately 
the market did not need the housing so quickly.  Similar in character is the adverse wealth 
effect of the stock market crash, although it is unclear whether the stock market wealth 
effect is part of the housing crash or is itself an independent stimulus.  In any case, it is 
important to quantify this (these) wealth effect(s). 
The substitution effect comes from the release of construction and other resources 
from the housing sector, which (in addition to the adverse wealth effect on labor supply) 
stimulates real investment (although it may reduce investment expenditure) in the 
nonresidential sector and drives down the value of existing capital.  Some amount of 
stock price decline results from the realization that many resources are leaving the 
residential sector. 
Section II examines the banking sector.  As Arrow (2008) points out, an adverse 
shock to the value of houses does not only harm the persons who live in them.  A variety 
of risk-sharing arrangements – especially collateralized home mortgages – serve to 
dissipate housing losses into the wider economy, and the banking sector is the conduit.  
Massive capital losses require the industry to reorganize.  This reorganization may itself 
create a liquidity crisis or add to investors’ preferences for safety, either of which adds to 
the stock market crash. 
Section III follows the substitution and wealth effects into the nonfinancial 
economy.  Consumers want to work more (especially persons nearing retirement who 
were planning on cashing in their stock market and home equity), which raises both 
employment and GDP relative to trend.  In the short run, greater labor supply lowers   3
wages (relative to trend) and raises unemployment rates.  As soon as capital can catch up 
to the extra labor supply, wages return to trend and the unemployment rate returns to 
normal.  We offer some back-of-the-envelope calculations of the potential magnitude of 
these effects.  For now, they can only be considered estimates to an order-of-magnitude, 
not precise estimates. 
Section IV considers the possible intermediation effect, and Section V presents 
some evidence that intermediation is still functioning normally.  Section VI concludes. 
 
I.   Housing Sector 
I.A.  Housing Prices will Fall 50% from their Peak 
  One simple model of the supply of housing is from Poterba (1984) and Topel and 
Rosen (1988), and is illustrated in Figure 1.  Demand for housing fluctuates over time, as 
there are changes in demographics, tax laws, credit market conditions, etc.  In the short 
run, the supply of housing is fixed, so higher demand increases prices.  The higher prices 
motivate additional construction (which is itself supplied with elasticity less than infinity 
in the short run) until prices fall back to long run construction cost.  This theory predicts 
that housing prices tend to revert back to construction cost – in other words, that the ratio 
of housing prices to construction cost tends to revert back to one.  To the extent that the 
construction industry has some factors of production that are fixed in the short run, 
construction costs deflated by CPI will themselves be above average during a housing 
boom and tend to revert back to the average.  In this case, the ratio of housing prices to 
CPI also reverts back to one.  The theory also predicts that (a) construction activity is 
higher when housing prices exceed construction costs and (b) regions whose real housing 
prices increased more will have the larger price declines in the long run. 
  Figure 2 displays monthly housing prices from Case-Shiller and OFHEO, 
deflected by the PPI for the residential construction industry, for the years 1987-2008.  
For many of the years prior to January 2000, both the Case-Shiller price index and the 
OFHEO price index indicate that housing prices increased about at the rate of 
construction costs, which is why the deflated housing prices are constant except for   4
occasional booms.  Although not shown in the Figure, those price booms are also periods 
of booms in construction activity.
2 
Real housing prices began to increase in 1997, and continued their increase until 
the end of 2005, according to Case-Shiller.
3  The most rapid decline occurred after 
November 2006.  If instead real housing prices had followed PPI-construction inflation 
from January 1999 through July 2008, they would have been 30% below their actual 
values in July 2008. In other words, as of July 2008 housing prices more to fall in order 
to reach the real value they had for several years prior to the boom.
4 
  The high housing prices of 1998-2006 are interpreted as a short run response to 
high (and perhaps increasing) demand.  Although the theory predicts that housing prices 
will eventually revert back to housing cost, it does not necessarily predict when – that 
depends on when demand stops shifting out and how long it takes for the construction 
industry to satisfy that demand.  The market in 2006 may well have understood that 
persons purchasing houses would suffer an inflation-adjusted capital loss over the long 
term, but it might not have anticipated what the short term gains or losses would be.  The 
expected capital losses in the long run are not necessarily reflective of a “bubble,” but 
may rather have served to ration housing.  In 2006, the demand for houses at the long-run 
construction cost exceeded the supply at that cost.The persons who actually got the 
houses in 2006 are the ones who were willing to expose themselves to the possible (and, 
in the long run, inevitable) capital loss. 
  If this theory is right, housing prices must eventually fall.  Any policy attempt 
(short of changing demographics or destroying some housing) to “stabilize” housing 
prices above one will only motivate construction beyond what would be demanded at a 
housing price of one and may even cause housing prices to ultimately fall below one. 
 
 
                                                 
2 See Chart 1-2 in the February 2007 Economic Report of the President. 
3 The OFHEO index shows the peak in 2007, which tells us that it is not suited for high-frequency analysis. 
Relative to January 2000 (and in nominal terms, the Case-Shiller peak is 30% higher than the OFHEO 
peak).  The BEA’s annual implicit price index for the residential housing stock peaks at the end of 2006, 
and the peak is only 21% higher than the year 2000 value. 
4 Glaeser (2008) shows that regions with larger housing price increases through 2006 had larger decreases 
since then.  Note that economically meaningful prices may have fallen more rapidly than indicated by the 
Case-Shiller index because of a lack of transactions since the boom’s peak.   5
I.B.  The Size of the Adverse Wealth Effect 
  The housing price crash was an adverse wealth effect; people must behave 
differently than they would have absent the crash.  However, the housing price boom may 
have been a favorable wealth effect that changed behavior in the other direction.  In other 
words, the impact of the crash itself is different from the impact of the boom and crash 
combined.  We are still working on a theoretical framework that would guide a more 
precise specification of counterfactuals.  For now, we consider two counterfactuals: (a) 
that the housing boom did not end in a crash but rather remained at 2006 levels and (b) 
that today’s stock of housing was built more smoothly over time (without a boom-bust) 
so that all houses were built at long-run construction cost rather than the actual prices 
shown in Figure 2.  The wealth effect derived from the latter will be smaller because 
most houses were not built at 2006 prices.  
In both cases, we need to measure how today’s housing prices relate to long-run 
construction cost and to actual historical housing prices.  We assume that today’s housing 
real prices are equal to long run construction cost, which is equal to actual real housing 
prices in a benchmark pre-boom point in time, such as January 1999.  Case-Shiller’s 
measure of historical housing prices is the one showing the largest difference between 
boom prices and January 1999: the latter price was 50% below the boom price.  The 
OFHEO index and the index implicit in the BEA’s real housing stock series imply a 
smaller difference: 27%. 
The larger concept of the adverse wealth effect of the housing price crash is equal 
to the change in price times the quantity of housing, which is equal to the amount by 
which the pre-crash housing stock exceeded its value at long run replacement cost.
5  
Table 1 experiments with two different estimates of how much pre-crash prices exceeded 
long run replacement cost: 50% (based on Case-Shiller) and 27% (OFHEO). 
  Table 1’s first row displays the total amount of the U.S. residential housing stock 
in place in January 2006, valued at January 2006 housing prices: $16.5 trillion.  The 
second row calculates the value of the same housing stock, using two scenarios: one with 
                                                 
5 At first glance, this might seem like an exaggeration because housing prices would have been expected to 
fall even in a world of perfect certainty – merely because pre-crash prices exceeded long run replacement 
cost.  However, those anticipated price reductions were (in theory) compensated by high rental values that 
never materialized.   6
50% lower prices, and the other with 27% lower prices.  If a housing price crash were to 
bring prices down by 50% (27%), $8.3 ($4.5) trillion would be lost.  Table 1’s third row 
shows the capital losses. 
  Table 1 also shows the cumulative cost of building too quickly since 1999.  The 
details are shown in Table 2, which is organized as one row for each year.  The first 
column is actual residential investment expenditure, as measured by the BEA.  The next 
six columns show estimates of actual housing prices and how they compare to the 
benchmark prices (January 1999).  The final three columns display the reduction in 
nominal investment expenditure that would have occurred had housing prices been as in 
January 1999, rather than their actual values.  The bottom of the table accumulates those 
reductions.  If we interpret the price premia as the cost of building the housing stock 
more quickly than can be supplied by the normal investment rates (that is, absent a 
boom), then the cost of building quickly was about one or two trillion dollars. 
 
 
II. Banking Sector: Risk Sharing, Mergers and Turnover 
II.A.  Housing Losses are Dissipated Among the Entire Population 
  Many houses serve as mortgage collateral, which means that (at the home-
owner’s discretion) houses become the property of mortgage lenders if housing prices fall 
so much as to eliminate the borrower’s equity.  The Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds 
shows that $9.4 trillion in mortgage loans were outstanding in 2006 Q2.  We are working 
on aggregating more detailed information on loan-to-value ratios, but for now, notice that 
a decline of a $8.3 trillion in home values could result in a loss of just $3.3 trillion (20% 
of the peak housing stock) for home-owners, with the remaining $5.0 trillion accruing to 
the mortgage lenders.
6  Note that the market capitalization of the financial component of 




                                                 
6 For the purpose of understanding the impact on the banking sector, the larger of the two loss concepts (the 
loss in housing value from the housing price crash, holding the boom constant) may be more appropriate.   7
II.B.  Efficient Adjustment of Banking Operations 
  The banking sector losses from the housing price crash are massive.  However, 
these costs are sunk, so there is no efficiency reason why massive losses by themselves 
would affect bank operations.  However, there are a couple of factors that could change 
the efficient operations of banks and other financial institutions.  First, the financial 
industry has continuously innovated, with its long-lasting achievements including the 
creation of mutual funds, consumer credit cards, junk bonds, etc.  The subprime home 
loan was a financial innovation that was not as successful on its first try, but may well be 
improved in the future.
7  The institutions inventing and implementing those 
improvements may well be different from those that had the largest subprime market 
shares prior to 2008. 
  Second, there may be a change in the willingness of persons to hold various 
financial assets.  For example, savers may no longer be willing to hold mortgages without 
a higher expected return.  This supply-of-capital effect would reduce the quantity of 
mortgages and thereby bank operations.  Third, even if portfolio preferences were 
unchanged at the micro-level, the significant redistribution of wealth resulting from the 
housing price crash may be correlated with those preferences.  Bank operations will have 
to change to serve the new mix of consumers. 
 
II.C.  Distribution of the Capital Losses and the Bank Capital Structure 
Even if efficient bank operations were unchanged, a change in the structure of the 
banking sector may be required to distribute the losses from the housing price crash.  
Unfortunately, a theory based on first order fundamentals alone does not predict who will 
pay for the capital losses or what will be a bank’s capital structure.  However, we know 
from the form of actual mortgage contracts that homeowners’ capital loss is (at their 
discretion) limited to their home equity.  Thus, absent public subsidies, the remaining 
capital loss must be absorbed by the shareholders of the institutions holding those 
mortgages and, if any remains, other creditors of those institutions.  To the extent that 
depositors are among the creditors who pay, the FDIC will cover their loss. 
                                                 
7 We owe this point to Kevin Murphy.  By “sub-prime,” we refer to borrowers with credit records that were 
traditionally inadequate for obtaining a home mortgage.   8
A simple theory of bank capital structure is that the desired capital structure for a 
solvent bank is a function of the diversity of the bank’s loan portfolio and its cost of 
equity capital (Harding, Liang, and Ross, 2007).  When loan values fall, banks seek to 
sell some of their loans, to raise shareholder equity, or to further diversify their loan 
portfolio.  When loan values fall for a wide cross-section of banks, a bank attempting to 
sell some of its loans or raise shareholder equity may be frustrated by his competitors’ 
attempts to do the same.
8 
Banks can merge in order to diversify their loan portfolios, especially when those 
mergers are across international borders.  Banks can raise capital by issuing new shares 
(as Bank of America announced in early October 2008 that it would do), or by being 
acquired by firms outside the banking industry. 
 
II.D.  Public Policy Effects on the New Bank Capital Structure 
  Both historical and prospective public policies affect bank capital structure and its 
responses to the housing price crash.  Those public policies fit into four or five general 
areas: anti-trust/merger policy, bankruptcy law, deposit insurance, bank regulation, and 
(perhaps) financial transactions by the Treasury and the Fed. 
  Anti-trust enforcement and banking law have arguably been more merger-friendly 
during the past two decades than they were for the four prior decades.  Both merger-
friendly anti-trust policy and financial innovation permit banks to further diversify their 
portfolios, reduce the probability of bankruptcy, and reduce desired capitalization rates.
9 
  As explained above, the housing price crash reduced bank capitalization rates and 
as a result, banks desire to recapitalize and diversify.  More merger-friendly policy will 
cause the banking industry to adjust more on the diversification margin than on the 
recapitalization margin, as compared to less merger-friendly policy.  If in fact banks’ 
costs of capital are also higher, more merger-friendly anti-trust policy will also reduce the 
                                                 
8 At this level of abstraction, the banking industry is no different than any other.  However, because a 
bank’s assets are also traded on financial markets, variations in the supply of capital to financial markets 
will cause additional correlation between the banking sector’s capital losses and the cost of capital.  
Moreover, because bank deposits have such different risk and liquidity characteristics than do bank assets, 
changes in the prices of risk or liquidity will affect their net worth even if bank asset fundamentals were 
unchanged. 
9 Although the additional diversification reduces the probability of bankruptcy, it increases the effect of 
nation-wide shocks on bankruptcy by reducing the desired capitalization rate.   9
amount by which the banking sector has to shrink.  In the very short run, bank merger 
policy has been especially merger-friendly, with the Federal Reserve and the Department 
of Justice expediting the mergers of troubled banks.
10 
  Bankruptcy law affects the probability of bankruptcy in part by affecting the costs 
incurred conditional on bankruptcy.  Some economists have proposed a one-time period 
of expedited bankruptcy proceedings so that the housing losses could be quickly 
distributed and the bank capital structure could more quickly return to its desired levels.  
As with any policy whose impact works in part through expectations, a one-time period 
of expedited bankruptcy may promote the expectation that expedited bankruptcy 
proceedings will occur again someday and thereby reduce the desired bank capitalization 
rate. 
  Deposit insurance has some of the same effects as expedited bankruptcy because 
it reduces the costs of bankruptcy to bank depositors: absent regulation it reduces desired 
capitalization rates for a given distribution of bank asset returns (equivalently, increases 
the riskiness of bank assets for a given capitalization rate) and thereby increases the 
probability of bankruptcy (Merton and Bodie, 1993).  However, deposit insurance is also 
accompanied by regulation, which in principle directly increases bank capitalization 
rates. 
 
II.E.  Public Transactions are Offset by Private Transactions 
In early October 2008, the Treasury proposed spending some of its revenue 
purchasing equity in struggling banks.  This proposal echoed the proposals of a number 
of academics.  However, none of the academics at the time explained how Treasury 
capitalization will crowd out private capitalization.  In the context of the model discussed 
above, Treasury purchases of bank equity raise the cost of capital to banks and thereby 
reduce private funding. 
To see this, assume for the moment that future taxes are lump sum (with a known 
incidence) and the economy is closed – i.e., that all potential bank stockholders are also 
                                                 
10 A change in merger policy should by itself impact output in the banking sector.  The direction of the 
impact depends on whether merger policy had previously been more or less merger-friendly than the 
output-maximizing policy and whether the output-maximizing anti-trust policy itself changed as a result of 
the housing price crash.   10
U.S. taxpayers.  In much the same way that taxpayers behave in Barro’s (1974) model, 
taxpayers will recognize that the Treasury has invested more in bank stocks, and has 
implicitly done so on their behalf because the taxpayers will reap the gains and pay the 
losses of those investments. As a result, taxpayers will attempt to reduce their holdings of 
bank stocks by the same amount that the Treasury increased them. 
  A number of “realistic” modifications to Barro’s (1974) model have been 
proposed, but they do not necessarily weaken the basic result that public transactions are 
at least partly offset by private transactions, and may strengthen it.  Consider first the 
possibility that taxpayer portfolio decisions are at a corner solution, so that taxpayers 
desire to reduce their holdings of the equity of existing banks but cannot.
11  If bank 
management were responsive to shareholder demands, banks would use the cash they 
obtain from Treasury investment to buy back bank shares from the public. 
  Again for the sake of argument, suppose that Treasury purchases were 
accompanied by (perhaps implicit) regulations restricting share repurchases and dividend 
payments.
12  Investors still desire to hold equity in new banks or in alternative institutions 
that would compete with banks and likely view that equity as (imperfectly) substitutable 
for equity in existing banks.  In other words, the portfolio-at-corner-solution view may 
explain how Treasury transactions would not be precisely neutralized by private sector 
transactions, but it predicts that the Treasury plan reallocates capital from new entrants to 
the banking industry and toward the existing (and struggling) banks.  This reallocation 
may harm the future efficiency of the banking industry. 
  Another modification to the Barro (1974) model assumes that taxpayers are 
unaware of what the Treasury is doing, and therefore have no motivation to offset 
Treasury transactions.  This modification may be applicable in some situations, but seems 
inapplicable today when (a) the much of America is focused on the financial crisis and 
public sector responses to it and (b) taxpayers loudly voiced their displeasure with the tax 
                                                 
11 This logical possibility probably does not accord with the facts, because Bank of America announced in 
early October 2008 that it would issue $10 billion worth of stock.  Furthermore, the banks receiving 
Treasury funds as of October 20, 2008 were paying dividends at an annual rate of $25 billion (Scharfstein 
and Stein, 2008). 
12 Note that these regulations are counter to the spirit of many of the academic proposals, which intend to 
keep the public sector out of bank business decisions.   11
liabilities they perceived to be created by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008. 
Yet another modification to the Barro (1974) model recognizes that taxes are not 
lump sum and do not have a known incidence.  But taxation deadweight costs and 
uncertain incidence only increases taxpayer exposure to bank stock risk, which might 
cause them to reduce their bank industry investments more than the Treasury increases 
them. 
 
II.F.  The Role of Complementarity in the Neutrality Result 
Barro’s model does not have industry detail – might those details trump Barro’s 
analysis?  Suppose that, when industry capitalization rates become low, each bank’s 
output is complementary with the others.
13  In this case, the most direct public policies 
for raising bank output would facilitate cooperation among banks by encouraging 
mergers or the formation of other private-sector institutions such as clearing houses or 
commercial paper exchanges to align each bank’s incentives with the industry-level 
complementarities.
14  Once banks were the proper size, the industry could otherwise be 
analyzed as if the complementarities were absent (with the same neutrality or non-
neutrality results). 
Suppose for the sake of argument that mergers and other private sector efforts 
were insufficient to internalize the complementarity, and that banks can be prevented 
from buying back shares or cutting dividends.  Even so, the impact of Treasury equity 
purchases depends on the terms of the purchase.  Greg Mankiw has proposed that the 
Treasury co-invest (on a non-voting basis) with private investors who decide “on their 
own” to make a purchase of a bank’s stock.  If (some subset of) taxpayers wanted to 
invest, say, $20 billion in bank ABC absent the Treasury plan, then there is nothing to 
stop them from investing $10 billion in the presence of the plan, thereby bringing the 
total ABC equity sale to $20 billion.  In this case, other banks in the industry are 
unaffected by the Treasury’s purchase, because bank ABC sells $20 billion regardless of 
whether the Treasury participates.  Greg Mankiw’s plan does nothing to align the 
                                                 
13 Presumably the complementarity was not significant at normal capitalization rates, or else banks would 
have already merged or cooperated with each other by contract. 
14 Among other things, we owe these examples to Fernando Alvarez.   12
incentives of the private co-investors with those of the industry as a whole, and is 
premised on two of the mechanisms that can deliver Barro’s result (that private investors 
are willing to invest even absent Treasury action and that bank managers are free to make 
dividend decisions, etc., to the shareholders’ advantage). 
In order to use complementarity to predict a significant effect of Treasury 
purchases on bank capitalization, we must also assume that private investments are at a 
corner solution.  In this case, a judicious choice of Treasury investment might raise the 
marginal product of capital throughout the industry, and presumably stimulate private 
investment. 
In summary, economic theory reminds us that Treasury transactions are at least 
partly offset by private sector transactions.  Each Treasury dollar spent on bank equity 
will reduce private ownership of bank equity by some multiple.  More research is needed 
to determine whether the multiple is close to zero, close to one, or even larger. 
 
III. Aggregate Market Responses I: The Wealth and Substitution Effects 
  The housing price crash both moves resources from residential to the non-
residential sector and changes household behavior via a wealth effect.  I consider these 
effects first, leaving until the next section possible intermediation effects of the banking 
crisis. 
 
III.A.  Investment Prices and The Stock Market Crash 
  As part owners of the housing stock, financial sector corporations are expected to 
have lost market capitalization from the housing price crash.  However, the value of 
nonfinancial capital can be affected as resources are released from the residential sector.  
In other words, as long as the housing construction boom continued and raised the prices 
of investment goods generally, the marginal product of nonresidential capital -- and 
therefore the value of the capital in that sector – was high.  The residential construction 
crash moved the economy down the capital good supply curve, thereby encouraging non-
residential investment, lowering the expected marginal product of capital (to the extent 
that the marginal product of capital diminishes), and lowering the value of existing 
nonresidential capital.   13
In order to see the possible magnitude of this effect, consider a simple steady state 
model of non-residential capital accumulation without adjustment costs.  New capital 
goods and old capital goods (adjusted for depreciation) are identical in production.  The 
resale price of old capital goods is equal to the present discounted value of the marginal 
product of capital, discounted using the sum of the interest rate and the depreciation rate.  
The resale price of one unit of old capital goods is also equal to the (assumed constant 
over time) production cost of one unit of new capital goods.  It follows that the quantity 
of non-residential capital is the amount that equates the marginal product of capital to the 
annuity value of the production cost of one unit of new capital goods, as shown in Figure 
3. 
A once-and-for-all reduction in the new capital good production cost increases 
real investment.  In fact, without adjustment costs, the capital stock jumps immediately to 
the new value: the annuity value of the new (lower) production cost of one unit of new 
capital goods.  The marginal product of that capital jumps down.
15  The resale price of 
old capital must equal the production cost of one unit of new capital goods, so it also 
jumps down.
16 
Figure 4 displays the BEA’s indices for real investment in residential and 
nonresidential structures.  The residential series increases from 2001 until the end of 2005 
(recall from Figure 1 that housing prices follow a similar pattern).  The nonresidential 
series falls from late 2001 through 2003, is flat until late 2005, after which it increases.  
By 2008 Q2, the real investment rate for non-residential structures was it its highest value 
for the 7.5 years shown in the Figure. 
Figure 4 also offers a rough estimate of how long the high non-residential 
investment rate will last.  If the year 2000 investment rates were considered normal (more 
work needs to be done to estimate a normal investment rate), then rates were 20% below 
normal for 4-5 years.  In other words, a whole year’s investment was lost.  In this case, 
we might expect real investment rates to be x percent above normal for 100/x years 
beyond the year 2005. 
                                                 
15 With adjustment costs, the capital stock would adjust slowly.  Real non-residential investment will be 
higher than normal while that adjustment occurs.  However, non-residential investment expenditure could 
be lower, because expenditure is the product of real investment and price of new capital goods. 
16 The resale price of old capital goods would jump down even if the capital stock itself were slowly 
adjusting.   14
Figure 5 displays the BEA’s implicit price index for non-residential capital 
(structures, equipment, and software combined), calculated by dividing the value of non-
residential capital by the quantity index for non-residential capital and normalizing the 
year 2000 to 1.  Gordon (1990) has shown how investment goods prices have followed a 
long term downward trend; Figure 5 shows how the housing boom may have interrupted 
that trend.  Because our economic logic is that housing prices affect residential 
investment which then impacts the price of non-residential capital, it is important to note 
that nonresidential investment prices peak in the third quarter of 2006.  By this measure, 
the price of non-residential capital falls by 4 percent from its peak, although less relative 
to trend. 
 
III.B.  The Wealth Effect on Labor Supply 
The housing price crash is an aggregate wealth effect.  As discussed above, we 
have considered two benchmarks for this wealth effect.  One benchmark – associated 
with the largest wealth loss – is that housing prices remained at 2006 levels.  For the 
purposes of predicting changes in consumer behavior, this benchmark is appropriate only 
if the wealth gains prior to 2006 were already fully reflected in behavior.  For example, 
people might have raised their consumption (perhaps with the help of home equity loans) 
and might have taken early retirements in accordance with their home equity gains.  At 
the other extreme, the wealth gains prior to 2006 had not yet been reflected in behavior, 
in which case the only wealth loss to consider is the cost of building the housing as 
quickly as it was built. 
Table 1 gives some idea of the magnitude of these two wealth losses.  The larger 
losses we estimated in the range of $4.5 – 8.3 trillion, with more weight on the latter 
because to the extent that the Case-Shiller prices are more accurate.  We estimated the 
smaller losses in the range of 1.0 – $1.8 trillion, perhaps (for the same reason) with more 
weight on the latter.  Henceforth, we use a $5 trillion loss (that is, 30 percent of the pre-
crash housing value); the reader can proportionally rescale the results that follow if she 
thinks an alternative loss is appropriate.
17   
                                                 
17 Some portion of the stock market loss might also be added.  We have not yet attempted to do so; we are 
still developing a theoretical framework for relating these various kinds of losses.   15
In order to translate a $5 trillion loss into behavior, it is necessary to put it in the context 
of overall wealth.  Table 3 is an attempt to do so.  The top part of the Table displays our 
assumptions about the importance of human and non-residential wealth relative to 
housing.  The bottom part of the Table shows logical implications of the parameters.  The 
housing stock is about half of all private fixed assets.  Judging from labor’s share of 
national income, private fixed assets may be about 25% of the combination of nonhuman 
capital and the human capital used in the market sector, which means that the housing 
stock is about 12.5% of total capital used in the market sector and perhaps 6 percent of all 
wealth (including the human capital used outside the market sector).  A 30% adverse 
shock to the value of the housing stock would therefore amount to about a 2% reduction 
in total national wealth.  If preferences were homothetic and the wealth effect were 
equally distributed, this would reduce consumption and leisure by 2%.  Assuming that 
leisure is four times work time, this amounts to about a 7.5% outward shift in the labor 
supply curve, as shown in the last row of Table 3. 
 The stock market crash is some combination of an aggregate wealth effect (to the 
extent that earnings prospects for a given path for the non-residential capital stock have 
been reduced), and a redistribution (to the extent that investment goods prices have fallen 
or discount factors have changed).  The housing price crash also has a redistributive 
component.  Of particular interest in this dimension is the redistribution away from (a) 
those near retirement age and (b) large nuclear families, because they may well have 
more elastic labor supply.
18  Persons near retirement are expected to bear a 
disproportionate share of the housing shock because they have the most home equity and 
because they have significant financial assets (among which are the financial stocks that 
absorbed much of the lost housing wealth).  Persons with large families are expected to 
bear a disproportionate share of the housing shock because they have larger homes. 
 
III.C.  Labor Supply’s Impact on GDP, Employment , Wages, and Capital Accumulation 
  In the long run, an increase in labor supply probably has little impact on wages 
and a proportional effect on output and the capital stock.  A 7.5 percent outward shift in 
                                                 
18 Large nuclear families are more likely to have the mother out of the workforce absent adverse wealth 
effects.   16
labor supply would eventually increase GDP by 7.5 percent.  In the short run (i.e., non-
labor inputs fixed), an increase in labor supply both raises employment and lowers wages 
in a proportion that depends on the relative short run wage elasticities of labor supply and 
labor demand. 
Table 4 displays some of the short run possibilities, assuming a Cobb-Douglas 
production function with labor’s share equal to 0.75.  This implies that labor demand is 
pretty wage elastic (4) in the short run, so the labor supply shift has a significant effect on 
wages unless labor supply is itself quite wage elastic.  Each row of the table considers 
different aggregate labor supply elasticities, expressed as a ratio to the labor demand 
elasticity.
19  The short run employment impact of a 0.075 log point labor supply shift 
could easily be (positive) 4 – 5 percent, with a GDP impact of about 3 – 4 percent. 
If, for example, the short run employment impact of a 0.075 log point percent 
labor supply shift were 0.047 log points, then the wage reduction moved along the labor 
supply curve 0.028 log points in the quantity dimension.  Given that the wage reduction 
is temporary, many of the persons represented on that part of the supply curve could call 
themselves unemployed.  Thus, the labor supply shift induced by the wealth effect of the 
housing crash could increase the unemployment rate by a couple of percentage points – 
even while it increases GDP – but less than 2.8 percentage points.  This result is shown in 
the last column of the table. 
  Another way to predict the behavioral changes resulting from a $5 trillion wealth 
loss is to examine historical reductions in the resources available to the private sector.  
During World War II, cumulate government purchases were above normal by about 2 
times trend GDP.  By today’s standards, that would be about a $25 trillion loss, or about 
five times a $5 trillion loss.  Total labor during the war was about 20% above trend, 
although it was encouraged by patriotism, and discouraged by high taxes and low interest 
rates (Mulligan 1998).  If we suppose that the effects of patriotism, taxes, and interest 
rates roughly offset, then 20% more labor is an estimate of the wealth effect of $25 
trillion.  For a $5 trillion wealth loss, Tables 3 and 4 show about 4 – 5% more labor in the 
                                                 
19 For example, the row labeled one means that the labor supply elasticity is equal to the labor demand 
elasticity, which is 4.   17
short run and 7.5% more labor in the long run, which suggests that, to an order of 




IV. Aggregate Market Responses II: The Intermediation Effect 
IV.A.  Substitutes and Complements with Banking Sector Output 
  Residential construction and automobile purchases are often financed with bank 
loans, so a bank crisis should impact those sectors more than others.  However, it is 
difficult to separate the impact of the bank crisis from a fundamental reduction in demand 
for those items.  Market demand for housing seemed to be down well before Bear Stearns 
or Lehman failed.  In theory, the high real housing prices of 2000-2006 should have 
increased housing construction only until the quantity of houses caught up with demand 
at the long run construction cost, after which construction should return to normal levels.  
If demand had fallen for any reason, then housing construction should be below normal 
levels.  In fact housing construction (measured, for example, by housing permits) was 
below normal levels already by mid-2007 – well before the banking crisis – and has 
continued to fall since then. 
  One possibility is that housing construction got so low in 2007 because banks had 
already withheld lending as they became aware of their low capitalization and began to 
acquire short-term assets.  In this case, the banking crisis may well explain the low 
housing construction via bank anticipation.  Notice that this logic implies that we can also 
learn about the impact of the banking crisis on other sectors from the data since 2007, 
because the reduction in bank loan supply predated the crisis itself. 
  Another possibility is that housing demand declined for reasons other than 
(anticipation of) the banking crisis, in which case further reductions in housing 
construction cannot be automatically attributed to the banking crisis itself.  Yet another 
possibility is that banks have constrained housing lending because prior lending amounts 
were beyond what was efficient.  For example, persons with low credit scores may be 
                                                 
20 Interestingly, despite the outward labor supply shift from patriotism and wealth effects, wartime 
unemployment rates were low.   18
having trouble obtaining mortgages. In this case, it is not the banking crisis that reduces 
construction, but a movement to more efficient lending. 
Automobile purchases are also subject to fundamental demand reductions.  Oil 
prices are much higher than they were for years, and today’s drivers want to “be green” 
and get good gas mileage.  American auto manufacturers are not fulfilling those needs 
right now, so their sales would be low even without a banking crisis.  It is hard to know 
how much the banking crisis contributed to the overall demand reduction. 
One way to determine whether credit supply has constricted is to look at mortgage 
and auto loan rates – to the degree they are constricted, those rates should be higher.  We 
are not aware of any significant increases those rates (see also Chari, Christiano, and 
Kehoe, 2008). 
 
IV.B.  The potential for retained earnings in today’s economy 
A significant majority of funds flowing from savers to investors in the U.S. 
economy do not leave savers in the form of bank deposits and do not arrive at investors in 
the form of bank loans.  Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (2008) used the Flow of Funds to 
estimate that 80 percent of business borrowing is done outside the banking system. 
Retained earnings can be one of the most important institutions for financing 
investment, because aggregate corporate earnings significantly exceed corporate 
investment.  The corporate sector pays significant dividends, and these could be cut to 
finance additional investment at the dividend-paying corporations or to finance 
investment at firms those corporations might acquire through merger.  Thus, even if bank 
lending disappeared for a time, this need not have a large impact on investment give the 
amount of corporate earnings in the economy and the banks’ small share of overall 
financial intermediation. 
 
IV.C.  Bank Output Declines Have Effects Opposite to the Wealth Effect 
There are two shocks supposedly hitting the non-financial sector (which is most 
of our economy) as a result of the banking crisis. One of them is an adverse saver-
investor intermediation shock. That is, the return to saving is low even while the cost of 
borrowing is high. The second shock is one of “confidence,” which is an adverse wealth   19
effect on consumption and leisure that only adds to the adverse wealth effects cited 
above. The intermediation shock has the opposite short run effects as do the adverse 
wealth effects.  Even if the intermediation shock were larger than we think, it would still 
be partly offset by the adverse wealth effects, which is why we are much less confident 
than many commentators that GDP will fall as a result of the housing and banking events 
in the last several months. 
Although consumption is 2/3 of GDP, a reduction in consumer confidence does 
not necessarily reduce GDP, because GDP is also related to the amount of capital and 
number of workers employed.  Baby-boomers are productive, knowledgeable people. If 
they stay in the workforce rather than retiring, that will result in more output, not less. 
 
 
V.  Evidence on Credit Supply to the Nonfinancial Sector 
V.A.  Credit Supply to Major Corporations, Fall 2008. 
The William Wrigley Jr, Company is a Chicago-based gum and confection 
company. It has lots of growing earnings, new products, and new locations. Back in April 
when stocks were very high (by today's standards), the Mars Corporation arranged to 
purchase the Wrigley Company for $23 billion in cash. The deal was set to close 6-12 
months later. 
By this fall, stock prices were down and the media was expressing a great deal of 
concern about a “credit crunch” that would stop perfectly good businesses from pursuing 
their best projects.  In conditions like those, it would seem that Mars might be tempted to 
back out of the deal -- perhaps to complain about credit even if were not really a problem. 
But Mars made no excuses: on Monday, October 6, Mars brought $23 billion in cash to 
close its deal with Wrigley. Much of that cash was borrowed. Mars now owns the 
Wrigley Company.  This multi-billion-dollar anecdote suggests opportunities still existed 
in the non-financial sector even after the bank crisis garnered world-wide attention, and at 
least some of those opportunities were being realized despite the so-called credit crunch. 
  More systematic evidence from major corporations is also available.  “The 
Corporate Executive Board finds that large multinationals are using good times of past to 
buy themselves time – they have long-term credit facilities and large cash holdings. One   20
of their recent polls found that more than 70% were not planning on proactively drawing 
down on their credit facilities, and that they believed they could still access 80-90% of 
their credit lines. Obviously the experience for the lowest rated CP issuers may be 
different, but most major corporations are not currently suffering from a credit crunch.”
21 
 
V.B.  Credit Supply After the Housing Crash 
  Most of the world had not realized that Fall 2008 would be the time when 
commercial paper markets would freeze and some major commercial banks would fail 
(with others gobbled up moments before failing). One story commonly told after the 
Lehman failure is that banks would cease lending, and this would take a sharp bite out of 
national investment, which in turn would bring down the economy. Since then, we have 
been waiting with anticipation to see what would happen to the economy as a whole.  
  It is quite possible that we do not have to wait. Suppose that, while most of the 
world did not anticipate these events, the troubled banks themselves understood this 
much earlier this year.  After all, they were involved in the daily operations in a way that 
most of the world was not. 
If the soon-to-be-troubled banks understood in 2008 Q1 and 2008 Q2 that they 
were flirting with bankruptcy, they should curtail lending in 2008 Q1 and 2008 Q2 in 
order to improve their short term asset positions.  They would add more value to their 
bank by turning away a mediocre customer in Q2 in order to improve the chances that 
they could lend it their best customers in Q3 and Q4.  In other words, we should have 
already seen much of the lending and investment impact of the bank troubles already in 
Q1 and Q2. 
We already have data for Q1 and Q2. Residential investment was down, of 
course, following the downward trend that began mid-2006 when housing prices peaked. 
But non-residential investment was UP (a bit), not down. In 2008 Q3, gross 
nonresidential investment expenditure was 4.64% of the capital stock (valued at current 
cost), as compared to 4.55% a year earlier and 4.58% two years earlier. 
 
 
                                                 
21 Personal communication from Mr. John Haskell of the Corporate Executive Board, October 13, 2008.   21
VI. Conclusions 
 
In hindsight, the U.S. economy has an improper allocation of capital between the 
residential and non-residential sectors.  Because capital is not readily moved from one 
sector to another, housing prices crashed and decreased household wealth.  Going 
forward, resources that would have been devoted to residential investment absent the 
crash will now be devoted to non-residential investment.  Pre-existing non-residential 
capital loses market value because of the residential price crash. 
In this regard, today’s U.S. economy has similarities to an economy that had part 
of its physical capital stock destroyed.  Both theory (Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 1993) 
and evidence (Hirshleifer, 1963) suggests that the latter economies would quickly 
transition from the short run situation to the long run.  The U.S. dynamics might be even 
quicker because the housing stock was not destroyed, but rather was (in hindsight) built 
too quickly. 
Absent a significant intermediation shock, our approach predicts greater 
employment and GDP.  3-4 percent above the previous trend is a rough estimate of the 
amount of the short run effect; seven percent is a rough estimate of the long run effect.  In 
the short run, wage rates will be below trend and unemployment higher.  For now, these 
findings can only be considered estimates to an order-of-magnitude, not precise 
estimates. 
In theory, an intermediation shock associated with the banking panic could reduce 
nonresidential investment.  However, there are reasons to believe that the intermediation 
shock might be quantitatively less important than the wealth and substitution effects 
coming directly from the housing crash.  In fact, data since the housing boom’s peak 
clearly show substitution between residential and non-residential investment.  It may take 
more time to confirm the wealth effects on labor supply, especially to the extent that the 
greater labor supply comes in the form of delayed retirements for baby boomers. 
 Table 1: The Size of the Adverse Wealth Effect
trillions of 2006 dollars
Crash of 50% Crash of 27%
U.S. Residential Housing Stock, January 2006
valued at January 2006 prices 16.5 16.5
post-crash value 8.3 12.0
Capital Loss 8.3 4.5
Addendum: Cost of Building Quickly 1.8 1.0
(see Table 2)
Cost of the Crash, holding 
the boom constantTable 2: The Cost of Building Quickly





(log points) actual Jan-99
premium 
(log points) Case-Shiller OFHEO
1999 424,850 96.0 93.0 0.031 97.2 96.9 0.004 13,148             1,508              
2000 446,901 107.8 93.0 0.148 103.1 96.9 0.062 61,331             26,991            
2001 469,277 120.7 93.0 0.260 110.4 96.9 0.131 107,621           57,527            
2002 503,937 134.5 93.0 0.369 118.7 96.9 0.203 155,580           92,395            
2003 572,384 149.6 93.0 0.475 125.0 96.9 0.255 216,594           128,787          
2004 675,482 166.1 93.0 0.580 127.7 96.9 0.276 297,320           162,722          
2005 769,643 183.1 93.0 0.678 131.7 96.9 0.307 378,778           203,427          
2006 756,961 184.9 93.0 0.687 131.6 96.9 0.306 376,233           199,590          
1,784,327      968,202        
Case-Shiller prices/PPI OFHEO prices/PPI Cost of Building Quickly
Total, accumulated with 5%/yr interest:Table 3: The Size of the Adverse Wealth Effect, Continued
Parameters
Pre-crash housing capital as a ratio to nonresidential capital 1
Human capital used outside the market sector, as a ratio to that used in the market sector 1
Leisure as a ratio to work time 4
Nonlabor's share 0.25
Wealth loss from the housing sector, as a share of pre-crash housing capital 0.3
Derived
Pre-crash housing capital as a ratio to private fixed capital 0.5
Private fixed capital as a share of private fixed capital + market human capital 0.25
Market human capital as a share of private fixed capital 3
Pre-crash housing capital as a ratio to all capital used in the market or housing sectors 0.125
Pre-crash housing capital as a ratio to all capital 0.063
Housing crash as a ratio to all capital 0.019
Crash translated into a proportional shift in labor supply 0.075Table 4: Equilibrium Short Run Labor Market Response to a 0.075 log point Labor Supply Shift
supply elasticity/ 
demand elasticity, 
SR log labor log wage rate log GDP




0.2 0.063 -0.016 0.047 1.3
0.4 0.054 -0.013 0.040 2.1
0.6 0.047 -0.012 0.035 2.8
0.8 0.042 -0.010 0.031 3.3
1 0.038 -0.009 0.028 3.8
Addendum: 
Long Run 0.075 0 0.075 0housing price

















































































Figure 3: Non-Residential Long Run Capital Supply and Demand
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